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OPINION  OF  THE  COURT 
________________ 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 We consider whether a district court, rather than an 
arbitrator, should decide if an agreement to arbitrate disputes 
between the parties to that agreement also authorizes 
classwide arbitration.  Because of the fundamental differences 
between classwide and individual arbitration, and the 
consequences of proceeding with one rather than the other, 
we hold that the availability of classwide arbitration is a 
substantive “question of arbitrability” to be decided by a court 
absent clear agreement otherwise.   
I.  Background 
 Plaintiffs David Opalinski and James McCabe 
(sometimes collectively referred to as “Appellees”), former 
employees of Robert Half International, Inc. (“RHI”), bring 
this action on behalf of themselves and other individuals, 
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alleging that RHI failed to pay them overtime and improperly 
classified them as overtime-exempt employees in violation of 
the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et 
seq.  Both McCabe and Opalinski signed employment 
agreements that contained arbitration provisions.  They 
provide that “[a]ny dispute or claim arising out of or relating 
to Employee’s employment, termination of employment or 
any provision of this Agreement” shall be submitted to 
arbitration.  Neither agreement mentions classwide 
arbitration. 
 
 RHI moved to compel arbitration of Opalinski and 
McCabe’s claims on an individual basis.  In October 2011, 
the District Court granted the motion in part, thus compelling 
arbitration but holding that the propriety of individual (also 
known as bilateral) versus classwide arbitration was for the 
arbitrator to decide (the “October 2011 Order”).  The Court 
subsequently entered an order terminating the case.  Rather 
than immediately appealing the October 2011 Order, RHI 
proceeded with the arbitration process and did not return to 
the District Court until the arbitrator issued a partial award 
and ruled that the employment agreements permitted 
classwide arbitration.  RHI then moved the District Court to 
vacate the arbitrator’s partial award.  The District Court 
denied the motion to vacate (the “December 2012 Order”). 
 
 RHI appeals the December 2012 Order.  The crux of 
the appeal, however, is not the underlying issue whether the 
employment agreements between the parties permit classwide 
as opposed to only bilateral arbitration.  Rather, the question 
before us is who decides – that is, should the availability of 
classwide arbitration have been decided by the arbitrator or 
by the District Court?  
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II.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over this action per 
28 U.S.C. § 1331 because Plaintiffs brought claims under the 
FLSA.  We have jurisdiction under 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(D) 
(“An appeal may be taken from . . . an order . . . confirming 
or denying confirmation of an award or partial award[.]”).    
 Appellees argue that this appeal is untimely because 
although RHI styles it as one based on the District Court’s 
December 2012 Order denying its motion to vacate, the 
appeal actually challenges only the October 2011 Order’s 
holding that the availability of classwide arbitration is a 
question for the arbitrator.  The October 2011 Order, 
Appellees contend, was a final decision that was immediately 
appealable on an interlocutory basis, and RHI’s attempt now 
to appeal the merits of that decision is untimely.  See Fed. R. 
App. P. 4(a)(1)(A) (party seeking to appeal a final decision 
must file notice of appeal within 30 days of entry of the 
judgment or order appealed from).   
 The Federal Arbitration Act “preserves immediate 
appeal of any ‘final decision with respect to an arbitration,’ . . 
. whether the decision is favorable or hostile to arbitration.”  
Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 86 
(2000) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3)).  A “final decision” is 
one that “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing 
more for the court to do but execute the judgment.”  Id. 
(quotation marks and citation omitted).  Here the October 
2011 Order was not a final decision because it effected only a 
non-final, administrative closure, and explicitly 
acknowledged the potential need for further litigation before 
the District Court.  Freeman v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 
709 F.3d 240, 247 (3d Cir. 2013) (“administrative closings 
are not final orders”).  RHI timely appealed the District 
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Court’s final decision – the December 2012 Order – and we 
have jurisdiction to consider this appeal.  
 “On appeal from a district court’s ruling on a motion 
to confirm or vacate an arbitration award, we review its legal 
conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error.”  
Sutter v. Oxford Health Plans LLC, 675 F.3d 215, 219 (3d 
Cir. 2012), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013).   
III.  Discussion 
 We decide first what arguments we may properly 
consider on this appeal.   Appellees contend that because RHI 
did not argue in its Motion to Vacate that the District Court 
(and not the arbitrator) should have determined the 
permissibility of classwide arbitration, it has waived its right 
to raise that argument in this appeal.  However, waiver, which 
is intended to protect litigants from unfair surprise and 
prevent district courts from being reversed on grounds that 
were never argued before them, does not apply in this 
instance.  Appellees were well aware of RHI’s argument that 
the District Court, not the arbitrator, should decide the 
availability of classwide arbitration: the Court expressly 
addressed the issue in its October 2011 Order, RHI objected 
to the arbitrator’s determination whether classwide arbitration 
was permissible throughout the arbitration proceedings, and 
RHI did flag the “who decides” issue in its Motion to Vacate 
by reminding the Court that “from the outset [RHI] has 
maintained that the class action issue is for this Court to 
decide.”  Thus, our addressing the issue on appeal prejudices 
neither Appellees nor the District Court. 
 We proceed to the merits of the case and consider 
whether, in the context of an otherwise silent contract, the 
availability of classwide arbitration is to be decided by a court 
rather than an arbitrator.  The analysis is twofold.  We decide 
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first whether the availability of classwide arbitration is a 
“question of arbitrability.”  See Howsam v. Dean Witter 
Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted).  If yes, it is presumed that the 
issue is “for judicial determination unless the parties clearly 
and unmistakably provide otherwise.”  Id. (internal quotation 
marks, citations, and alteration omitted).  If the availability of 
classwide arbitration is not a “question of arbitrability,” it is 
presumptively for the arbitrator to resolve. See First Options 
of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944-45 (1994). 
A. Is the availability of classwide arbitration a “question 
of arbitrability”? 
 “[A]rbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot 
be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has 
not agreed so to submit.”  Howsam, 537 U.S. at 83 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  While federal policy 
favors arbitration agreements, an arbitrator has the power to 
decide an issue only if the parties have authorized the 
arbitrator to do so.  Because parties frequently disagree 
whether a particular dispute is arbitrable, courts play a limited 
threshold role in determining “whether the parties have 
submitted a particular dispute to arbitration, i.e., the ‘question 
of arbitrability[.]’”  Id. at 83 (emphasis in original).   
  “Questions of arbitrability” are limited to a narrow 
range of gateway issues.  They may include, for example, 
“whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration clause” 
or “whether an arbitration clause in a concededly binding 
contract applies to a particular type of controversy.”  Id. at 84.  
On the other hand, questions that the parties would likely 
expect the arbitrator to decide are not “questions of 
arbitrability.”  Id.  Those include “‘procedural’ questions that 
grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition[,]” as 
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well as allegations of waiver, delay, or similar defenses to 
arbitrability.  Id.   
 The Supreme Court has not yet decided whether the 
availability of class arbitration is a “question of arbitrability.”  
In Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 
(2003), a plurality of the Court concluded that the availability 
of classwide arbitration was not a question of arbitrability 
because “it concerns neither the validity of the arbitration 
clause nor its applicability to the underlying dispute between 
the parties . . . [, but only] contract interpretation and 
arbitration procedures.”  Id. at 451, 452-53.   
 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions, however, cast 
doubt on the Bazzle plurality’s decision.  In Stolt-Nielsen S.A. 
v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010), the 
Court specifically noted that “only the plurality” in Bazzle 
decided that an arbitrator should determine whether a contract 
permits classwide arbitration and Bazzle is accordingly not 
binding on this point.  Id. at 680.  And in Oxford Health 
Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013), the Court again 
stated that it “has not yet decided whether the availability of 
class arbitration” is for a court or for an arbitrator to resolve.  
Id. at 2069 n.2.   
 Our Court has also not decided whether the availability 
of classwide arbitration is a question of arbitrability.  We 
briefly addressed the issue in Quilloin v. Tenett HealthSys. 
Philadelphia, Inc., 673 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2012), where we 
concluded that classwide arbitration was not a question of 
arbitrability.  Id. at 232 (“Silence regarding class arbitration 
generally indicates a prohibition against class arbitration, but 
the actual determination as to whether class action is 
prohibited is a question of interpretation and procedure for the 
arbitrator.”).  However, this single sentence addressing “who 
decides” is a dictum because at the district court level the 
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parties in Quilloin had already agreed that the arbitrator 
should be the one to determine whether the contract provided 
for class action arbitration.   See Quilloin v. Tenett HealthSys. 
Philadelphia, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 707, 727 n.22 (E.D. Pa. 
2011).  Additionally, Quilloin relied solely on the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Stolt-Nielsen for its conclusion that the 
availability of class arbitration is a question of procedure for 
the arbitrator to decide.  See 673 F.3d at 232.  This reliance 
falls short: not only does Stolt-Nielsen expressly state that the 
Supreme Court has not yet resolved the “who decides” issue 
but, as explained below, the opinion also indicates that the 
availability of classwide arbitration is a question of substance 
rather than procedure.  Thus, whether the availability of 
classwide arbitration is a “question of arbitrability” to be 
presumptively decided by a court remains an open question.   
 Our Court has explained that questions of arbitrability 
generally fall into two categories – (1) when the parties 
dispute “whether [they] have a valid arbitration agreement at 
all” (whose claims the arbitrator may adjudicate); and (2) 
“when the parties are in dispute as to whether a concededly 
binding arbitration clause applies to a certain type of 
controversy” (what types of controversies the arbitrator may 
decide).  Puleo v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 605 F.3d 172, 178 
(3d Cir. 2010) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  The crucial consideration is the expectation 
of the contracting parties:  We do not “forc[e] parties to 
arbitrate a matter that they may well not have agreed to 
arbitrate.”  Howsam, 537 U.S. at 83.  We now hold that 
whether an agreement provides for classwide arbitration is a 
“question of arbitrability” to be decided by the District Court.   
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 1. The availability of class arbitration implicates 
whose claims the arbitrator may resolve. 
 The Supreme Court has long recognized that a district 
court must determine whose claims an arbitrator is authorized 
to decide.  In John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 
543 (1964), the defending company claimed it was not bound 
by the arbitration provisions of an agreement signed by a 
company with which it had merged.  Id. at 546-47.  The Court 
stated that there was “no doubt” that the issue “whether or not 
the company was bound to arbitrate, as well as what issues it 
must arbitrate, is a matter to be determined by the Court . . . .”  
Id. at 546-47 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  
Similarly, in First Options individual business owners argued 
that they were not personally bound by an arbitration 
agreement they had signed on behalf of their wholly owned 
company.  See 514 U.S. at 941-42.  The Court again 
concluded that this was a “question of arbitrability” to be 
presumptively determined by a court absent clear contractual 
language to the contrary.  Id. at 946-47.  Our Circuit has also 
held repeatedly that whose claims an arbitrator may decide is 
an issue for the courts.  See, e.g., Allstate Settlement Corp. v. 
Rapid Settlements, Ltd., 559 F.3d 164, 169 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(“[w]hether the arbitrator’s award binds [a third-party] is a 
question that the court must decide”); Sandvik AB v. Advent 
Int’l Corp., 220 F.3d 99, 107 (3d Cir. 2000) (determining 
“whether Huep’s signature bound Advent” was “a necessary 
prerequisite to the court’s fulfilling its role of determining 
whether the dispute is one for an arbitrator to decide”). 
 Here, based on the agreement to arbitrate with 
Opalinski and McCabe, RHI moved to compel bilateral 
arbitration with each of them.  By seeking classwide 
arbitration, however, Opalinski and McCabe contend that 
their arbitration agreements empower the arbitrator to resolve 
not only their personal claims but the claims of additional 
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individuals not currently parties to this action.  The 
determination whether RHI must include absent individuals in 
its arbitrations with Opalinski or McCabe affects whose 
claims may be arbitrated and is thus a question of arbitrability 
to be decided by the court.  See Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 683 
(“parties may specify with whom they choose to arbitrate their 
disputes” (emphasis in original)); id. at 686 (in classwide 
arbitration, the arbitrator “no longer resolves a single dispute 
between the parties to a single agreement, but instead resolves 
many disputes between hundreds or perhaps even thousands 
of parties”).  Additionally, as Justice Alito warned in his 
concurrence in Oxford Health, courts should be wary of 
concluding that the availability of classwide arbitration is for 
the arbitrator to decide, as that decision implicates the rights 
of absent class members without their consent.  133 S. Ct. at 
2071-72 (Alito, J., concurring) (“at least where absent class 
members have not been required to opt in, it is difficult to see 
how an arbitrator’s decision to conduct class proceedings 
could bind absent class members who have not authorized the 
arbitrator to decide on a classwide basis which arbitration 
procedures are to be used” (emphasis in original)).     
 2. The availability of classwide arbitration 
implicates the type of controversy submitted to arbitration. 
 The availability of classwide arbitration is a “question 
of arbitrability” for a second, independent reason – it 
concerns “whether a concededly binding arbitration clause 
applies to a certain type of controversy.”  Puleo, 605 F.3d at 
178 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also 
Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 
297 (2010) (“[A] court may order arbitration of a particular 
dispute only where the court is satisfied that the parties 
agreed to arbitrate that dispute[.]” (emphasis in original)).   
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 Opalinski and McCabe argue that, because class 
actions in the context of traditional litigation are a procedural 
construct, the availability of classwide arbitration is also a 
procedural question.  In Stolt-Nielsen, however, the Supreme 
Court expressly disclaimed classwide arbitration as simply 
procedural.  559 U.S. at 687 (the differences between class 
and individual arbitration cannot be characterized as a 
question of “merely what ‘procedural mode’ [i]s available to 
present [a party’s] claims”).  The Court stated that “class-
action arbitration changes the nature of arbitration to such a 
degree that it cannot be presumed the parties consented to it 
by simply agreeing to submit their disputes to an arbitrator.”  
Id. at 685.  To further the point, it continued on to explain the 
numerous differences between bilateral and class arbitration, 
notably that 
[(1) a]n arbitrator . . . no longer resolves a 
single dispute between the parties to a single 
agreement, but instead resolves many disputes 
between hundreds or perhaps even thousands of 
parties . . . [; (2)] the presumption of privacy 
and confidentiality that applies in many bilateral 
arbitrations [does] not apply in class 
arbitrations[,] thus potentially frustrating the 
parties’ assumptions when they agreed to 
arbitrate[; (3) t]he arbitrator’s award no longer 
purports to bind just the parties to a single 
arbitration agreement, but adjudicates the rights 
of absent parties as well[; and (4)] the 
commercial stakes of class-action arbitration are 
comparable to those of class-action litigation, 
even though the scope of judicial review is 
much more limited.   
Id. at 686-87 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  
In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 
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(2011), the Court similarly emphasized that the “changes 
brought about by the shift from bilateral arbitration to class-
action arbitration are fundamental,” concluding that 
“[a]rbitration is poorly suited to the higher stakes of class 
litigation” and that classwide arbitration “is not arbitration as 
envisioned by the FAA.”  Id. at 1750, 1751-53 (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 Accordingly, we read the Supreme Court as 
characterizing the permissibility of classwide arbitration not 
solely as a question of procedure or contract interpretation but 
as a substantive gateway dispute qualitatively separate from 
deciding an individual quarrel.  Traditional individual 
arbitration and class arbitration are so distinct that a choice 
between the two goes, we believe, to the very type of 
controversy to be resolved.  We turn below to the support our 
Sixth Circuit colleagues give to this conclusion.   
 3. Other Circuits 
 The only other Circuit Court of Appeals to have 
squarely resolved the “who decides” issue is the Sixth, which 
has also held that “whether an arbitration agreement permits 
classwide arbitration is a gateway matter” that is 
presumptively “for judicial determination[.]”  Reed Elsevier, 
Inc. v. Crockett, 734 F.3d 594, 599 (6th Cir. 2013) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  Citing to Concepcion, 
Oxford Health, and Stolt-Nielsen, the Sixth Circuit Court 
reviewed the differences between classwide and bilateral 
arbitration and noted that “recently the [Supreme] Court has 
given every indication, short of an outright holding, that 
classwide arbitrability is a gateway question rather than a 
subsidiary one.”  Id. at 598.  Specifically, the Sixth Circuit 
reasoned that 
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[g]ateway questions are fundamental to the 
manner in which the parties will resolve their 
dispute – whereas subsidiary questions, by 
comparison, concern details. And whether the 
parties arbitrate one claim or 1,000 in a single 
proceeding is no mere detail. Unlike the 
question whether, say, one party to an 
arbitration agreement has waived his claim 
against the other – which of course is a 
subsidiary question – the question whether the 
parties agreed to classwide arbitration is vastly 
more consequential than even the gateway 
question whether they agreed to arbitrate 
bilaterally. An incorrect answer in favor of 
classwide arbitration would “forc[e] parties to 
arbitrate” not merely a single “matter that they 
may well not have agreed to arbitrate” but 
thousands of them.  
Id. at 598-99 (second alteration in original) (internal citation 
omitted) (quoting Howsam, 537 U.S. at 84).  This analysis is 
persuasive and guides our own.   
 Appellees argue that the First, Second and Eleventh 
Circuits have also considered the “who decides” question and 
have concluded that the availability of classwide arbitration is 
not a question of arbitrability for the court but rather a 
question of procedure for the arbitrator to decide.  See S. 
Commc’ns Servs., Inc. v. Thomas, 720 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 
2013); Fantastic Sams Franchise Corp. v. FSRO Ass’n Ltd., 
683 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2012); Jock v. Sterling Jewelers Inc., 
646 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2011).  This is untrue, as none of those 
Circuits ruled, or even expressed a view, on the issue before 
us.  The First Circuit’s decision in Fantastic Sams involved 
associational arbitration, not class arbitration, and expressly 
recognized that an “associational action . . . is [not] equivalent 
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to a class action.”  683 F.3d at 23.  In Jock, the Second 
Circuit noted repeatedly that the parties had submitted the 
question whether their contract allowed for classwide 
arbitration to the arbitrator, and so the “who decides” 
question was not before the Court.  See 646 F.3d at 116, 124.  
And far from holding that the availability of classwide 
arbitration is for the arbitrator to decide, the Eleventh Circuit 
has specifically stated that the question remains unresolved.  
See S. Commc’ns Servs., 720 F.3d at 1359 n.6 (“Like the 
Supreme Court, we also have not decided whether the 
availability of class arbitration is a question of 
arbitrability[.]”).   
 Since Bazzle, the Supreme Court has not directly 
decided whether the availability of class arbitration is a 
question of arbitrability.  The Court’s line of post-Bazzle 
opinions, however, indicates that, because of the fundamental 
differences between classwide and bilateral arbitration, and 
the consequences of proceeding with one rather than the 
other, the availability of classwide arbitrability is a 
substantive gateway question rather than a procedural one.  
We thus join the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in holding 
that the availability of class arbitration is a “question of 
arbitrability.”  
B. There is no evidence rebutting the presumption that 
the District Court should  decide all questions of 
arbitrability. 
 It is presumed that courts must decide questions of 
arbitrability “unless the parties clearly and unmistakably 
provide otherwise.”  Howsam, 537 U.S. at 83 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  The burden of 
overcoming the presumption is onerous, as it requires express 
contractual language unambiguously delegating the question 
of arbitrability to the arbitrator.  See Major League Umpires 
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Ass’n v. Am. League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 357 F.3d 272, 
280-81 (3d Cir. 2004).  Silence or ambiguous contractual 
language is insufficient to rebut the presumption.  Gen. Elec. 
Co. v. Deutz AG, 270 F.3d 144, 154-55 (3d Cir. 2001).  Here, 
Opalinski and McCabe’s employment agreements provide for 
arbitration of any dispute or claim arising out of or relating to 
their employment but are silent as to the availability of 
classwide arbitration or whether the question should be 
submitted to the arbitrator.  Nothing else in the agreements or 
record suggests that the parties agreed to submit questions of 
arbitrability to the arbitrator.  Thus, the strong presumption 
favoring judicial resolution of questions of arbitrability is not 
undone, and the District Court had to decide whether the 
arbitration agreements permitted classwide arbitration.   
 
 The District Court’s October 2011 Order directing the 
arbitrator to decide the availability of classwide arbitration, 
and December 2012 Order denying RHI’s motion to vacate 
the arbitrator’s partial final award, are reversed.  This case is 
remanded for the District Court to determine whether 
Appellees’ employment agreements call for classwide 
arbitration.  
*    *    *    *    * 
 “Arbitration is fundamentally a creature of contract, 
and an arbitrator’s authority is derived from an agreement to 
arbitrate.”  Puleo, 605 F.3d at 194 (alteration in original) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  Here, where 
we have an agreement to arbitrate individual disputes and no 
mention of arbitration for a wider group, we believe the 
parties would have expected a court, not an arbitrator, to 
determine the availability of class arbitration.  This is 
especially so given the critical differences between individual 
and class arbitration and the significant consequences of that 
determination for both whose claims are subject to arbitration 
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and the type of controversy to be arbitrated.  Hence we hold 
that the availability of class arbitration is a “question of 
arbitrability” for a court to decide unless the parties 
unmistakably provide otherwise.  
 
